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Abstract: As many as two-thirds of newly-released inmates will be arrested for a new offense 
within three years. This study evaluates the impact of job assistance on recidivism rates among 
ex-offenders. The job assistance program, run though the private company America Works, uses 
a network of employers to place clients. Ex-offenders were randomly assigned to intensive job 
assistance (treatment group) or the standard program (control group). The intensive program is 
meant to improve average work readiness for ex-offenders. It reduces the likelihood of 
subsequent arrest among non-violent ex-offenders, but has little effect on violent ex-offenders. 
The re-arrest rate for non-violent ex-offenders in the treatment group was 19 percentage points 
lower than those in the control group. The re-arrest rate for violent ex-offenders in the treatment 
group was indistinguishable from those in the control group. We estimate benefits from intensive 
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Approximately 650,000 people are released from federal and state jails and prisons in the 
U.S. annually.2 Ex-offenders face daunting challenges in returning to society. Upon release, they 
are likely to struggle with substance abuse, lack of adequate education and job skills, limited 
housing options, and mental health issues.3 
A great deal of taxpayer money has been spent on job assistance programs for this group. 
The U.S. has a long history of providing federal funding for community employment programs 
for ex-offenders, generally involving some combination of job-readiness (résumé writing, 
interview techniques, and the like), job-training (teaching skills related to specific jobs), and job-
placement services (Visher et al. 2005). Although the direct benefits that come from such 
programs accrue to ex-offenders and are therefore private in nature, such programs also create 
social returns by lowering an individual’s likelihood of recidivism (Drake et al. 2009; Bushway 
and Apel 2012; Cook et al, 2015). Having a legitimate job reduces the likelihood of recidivism 
for ex-offenders (Sampson and Laub 1997; Harer 1994). 
Recidivism rates are extremely high; roughly two-thirds of ex-offenders are arrested for a 
new offense within three years of their release (Beck and Shipley 1989; Langan and Levin 
2002).4 As noted in Cook et al. (2015), this is particularly true of violent offenders who face 
more difficult job placement experiences. Violent offenders in particular may be of significant 
concern to employers due to the perception that these individuals are more likely to be violent in 
general, potentially causing problems with other employees, customers and liability. If job-
assistance programs reduce subsequent criminal activity as well as the chance that ex-offenders 
will be rearrested, then the social returns will be large. In the U.S., more than 23 million criminal 
offenses were committed in 2007, resulting in approximately $15 billion in economic losses to 
victims and $179 billion in government expenditures on police, judicial, and legal activities, as 
 
2 See http://www.justice.gov/archive/fbci/progmenu_reentry.html (accessed July 12, 2019). Holzer et al. (2003) note 
that more than 600,000 offenders are released, while Raphael (2010) notes that 725,000 inmates were released from 
either state or federal facilities. In 2011, more than 688,000 were released (Carson and Sabol, 2012). 
3 See http://www.nij.gov/topics/corrections/reentry/Pages/welcome.aspx (accessed July 12, 2019). 
4 This statistic comes from a Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) study on recidivism from prisoners released in 1994 
from 15 states. A different research report found that the three-year recidivism rate was 45 percent for inmates 
released in 1999 and 43 percent for those freed in 2004 (Pew Center on the States 2011). A newer study on the 
recidivism rates of state prisoners released in 2005 revealed 68 percent were arrested within three years. See 
https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=6266 (accessed July 12, 2019). 
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well as corrections (U.S. Department of Justice 2004, 2007, 2008). As McCollister et al. (2010) 
show, even relatively small crimes – like vandalism and larceny/theft – entail social costs of 
several thousand dollars, while major crimes – rape/sexual assault and murder – impose 
extremely high costs on society. 
With respect to finding employment, ex-offenders face many challenges because of 
supply-side factors as well as demand-side factors.5 One important supply-side factor is the low 
level of education, training, and job experience possessed by many ex-offenders. Researchers 
have found that 40-70 percent of ex-offenders are high school dropouts (Harlow 2003; Travis et 
al. 2001; Freeman 1992). Harlow (2003) also found that 21-38 percent were unemployed when 
initially incarcerated. Ex-offenders also face important demand-side barriers; most employers are 
very reluctant to hire individuals with criminal records (Holzer et al. 2003). Some jobs or 
occupations are legally closed to those with felony convictions (Hahn 1991), while other jobs 
require significant levels of trustworthiness that ex-offenders are unlikely to have (Holzer et al. 
2003). Many companies are also averse to employing ex-offenders because of the legal risk from 
negligent hiring (Glynn 1988; Bushway 1996; Connerley et al. 2001). 
Widespread use of criminal background checks increases the difficulty for ex-offenders 
to find employment. The National Task Force on the Commercial Sale of Criminal Justice 
Information notes an “explosion” in criminal background checks since September 11, 2001, with 
millions of additional criminal record checks routinely conducted.6 Approximately two-thirds of 
employers conduct criminal background checks on all job candidates (Society for Human 
Resource Management 2012). Roughly half conduct such checks to reduce liability for negligent 
hiring and to ensure a safe work environment. Non-violent felonies, in addition to violent crimes, 
are very influential in decisions not to extend job offers. Recent experimental work finds that 
employers that asked about criminal records were 63% more likely to call applicants with no 
criminal record (Agan and Starr, 2018). Interestingly, callback rates do not vary much by non-
violent crime type or race (Agan and Starr, 2017). Public sentiment towards background checks 
has waned in recent years coinciding with government-imposed “ban the box” policies, which 
 
5 Holzer et al. (2003) note that supply-side factors include limited education, cognitive skills, and work experience 
as well as substance abuse and other physical/mental health problems. Many ex-offenders also face racial 
discrimination. 
6 See http://www.search.org/files/pdf/ReportofNTFCBA.pdf (accessed July 12, 2019) and 




prevent employers from asking about a job applicant’s criminal record until late in the hiring 
process. Recent work shows negative effects of such policies on labor market outcomes.7 As a 
consequence, overcoming initial barriers to employment remains critical for those with criminal 
backgrounds. Even if ban the box policies are effective at improving employment of ex-
offenders, only 13 states and 18 cities extend such policies to private employment (Avery, 2019). 
To the extent that job assistance programs can overcome inherent barriers that ex-
offenders face obtaining employment, such programs could play a role in reducing criminal 
recidivism. This study provides results from an experimental evaluation of an intensive job 
assistance program aimed at improving job readiness and placements. The experiment involved 
259 ex-offenders in New York. Randomization enrolled approximately half of enrollees to the 
intensive job assistance program while the remainder were enrolled in a standard program 
(offering less intensive job-readiness skills and self-directed job search). Job assistance sessions 
were administered on a rolling basis between June 2009 and December 2010. Of the initial 259 
participants, 219 were linked to administrative arrest records obtained through July 2012, 
meaning our study follows participants for 18 to 36 months after the randomized intervention. 
The intensive program was administered by America Works, a New York-based private 
employment company with operations in seven states and the District of Columbia. The firm has 
more than 30 years of experience providing job assistance programs to groups that typically face 
significant barriers in the labor market. The program consists of intensive, short-term job-
readiness training, job placement, re-placement in cases where the initial placement does not last, 
and regular follow-up and support for six months to ensure successful employment.8 
Several features distinguish the America Works job assistance program from other 
employment programs. As with many of the chronically unemployed, overwhelming numbers of 
ex-offenders lack work experience, have little education, and do not know how to look for a job. 
The job assistance program is short-term nature (one to two weeks) with a “tough-love” 
approach. It stresses interpersonal communication: listening to coworkers and supervisors, 
following instructions, and being honest and responsive. Other “soft skills,” such as time 
management and anger management, are also developed. For the ex-offender population, this 
 
7 Recent work finds statistical discrimination from ban the box policies, especially for young African-American men 
(Agan and Starr, 2018; Doleac and Hansen, 2020). 
8 The description of America Works programs closely follows internal memos produced by Public/Private Ventures, 
“Moving Men into the Mainstream: Study Brief,” April 2006. 
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training may have particular resonance, as it reinforces coping and communications skills 
learned in prison. America Works operates exclusively through performance-based contracts; the 
firm does not receive payment for services until clients are placed and retained for a stipulated 
period in a job. The company’s contracts with New York’s Human Resources Administration 
(HRA) and other agencies raise the likelihood that the jobs that America Works finds for its 
clients are good matches and that its clients are paid fairly and have opportunities to advance. 
The company actively engages in finding further placements if initial placements are not 
successful. America Works provides a guarantee to employers that it can successfully fill 
positions and ensures that if problems arise, employers can discuss their concerns. Given 
employers’ reluctance to consider ex-offenders, such a guarantee may be an important impetus to 
hiring high-risk applicants. 
Our evaluation context is relatively rare because of the randomized controlled trial 
(RCT). Based upon the observed participant characteristics, we find that the randomization 
appears to be carried out successful. The overall effect of intensive job assistance program is not 
statistically significant. However, there are important differences between violent and non-
violent ex-offenders. The non-violent ex-offenders respond favorably to the intensive program. 
Only 31 percent of non-violent ex-offenders in the intensive program were subsequently arrested 
during the observation period, compared with 50 percent in the standard job assistance program. 
In contrast, there was no statistically significant different for violent ex-offenders (45 percent 
versus 43 percent). We also estimate the impacts on societal costs of recidivism. The evidence 
supports the notion that intensive job assistance program is effective for non-violent ex-
offenders, but not effective for violent ex-offenders. 
Section II of this paper summarizes existing evidence on reintegrating ex-offenders into 
society. Section III describes the aforementioned randomized controlled trial and observations 
from site visits. Section IV discusses various data limitations of the analysis and explains the 
focus on criminal recidivism. Section V provides data description and empirical results. Section 







II. Existing Evidence on Reintegrating Ex-Offenders into Society 
 
 As Visher et al. (2005) note, community-based employment interventions for ex-
offenders date as far back as the 1960s, with a series of well-known federal job-training 
programs following in the 1970s and 1980s, including the 1973 Comprehensive Employment 
and Training Act (CETA), the 1983 Job Training and Partnership Act (JTPA), and the 1998 
Workforce Investment Act (WIN). However, virtually all evaluations of prisoner reentry and 
crime-abatement programs use nonexperimental techniques. Drake et al. (2009) identify 545 
program evaluations, of which fewer than 5 percent used randomized controls. Cook et al. (2015) 
identify only eight randomized trials prior to theirs, and only four of these (including Cook et al. 
2015) were after 2000. As a consequence, relatively few recent studies use methods comparable 
to our study. 
Visher et al. (2005) conduct a meta-analysis of experimental evaluations of noncustodial 
employment programs for adult ex-offenders, where the program had to include, at a minimum, 
job training or placement. They note that only eight studies using random assignment could be 
identified in English-language publications; they characterize the knowledge about the effects of 
such programs as “hampered by inadequate contemporary research.” The eight studies, 
implemented between 1971 and 1994, involved the Baltimore Living Insurance for Ex-Prisoners 
(LIFE); Transitional Aid Research Project (TARP); National Supported Work Demonstration 
(NSW), a job-training program for probationers; Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA); 
JOBSTART; Job Corps; and Opportunity to Succeed (OPTS). In these studies, recidivism 
measures included arrests, based on official records or self-reported behavior, for periods of up 
to 36 months after participation in the employment program. Based on their meta-analysis, 
Visher et al. conclude that the “eight interventions had no significant effect on the likelihood that 
participants would be rearrested.” 
Raphael (2010) and Cook et al. (2015) discuss a number of more recent experimental 
studies of prisoner reentry efforts, including the Center for Employment Opportunities (CEO), 
based in New York City. The one-year evaluations of this program show little impact on 
recidivism (Bloom et al. 2007), but the second-year results showed that the treatment group was 
approximately 8 percentage points less likely to be convicted of a crime and 7 percent less likely 
to have experienced a post-release incarceration in prison or jail (Redcross et al. 2010). Raphael 
concludes that there is some evidence that income support, transitional employment, and human 
7 
 
capital investments in ex-offenders may reduce criminal behavior and recidivism. Cook et al. 
(2015) evaluate an experimental study implemented by the Wisconsin Department of Corrections 
where “reach in” services were provided to violent offenders prior to release. They found that in 
the one year window of their study, the treatment group saw 0.13 fewer arrests than the control 
group. While the probability of being arrested within one year was lower for the treatment group, 
and statistically significant, the gains were modest in practical terms. 
Doleac (2018) provides a comprehensive review of interventions designed to reduce 
recidivism and to promote employment, housing and health improvements among released 
felons. In general, a variety of approaches toward re-employment have been pursued. Temporary 
or transitional jobs, often through non-profit organizations, have been examined by Valentine, 
Jacobs and Redcross (2015) who find little impact on employment or recidivism. Similarly, 
Cook et al (2015) examine a transitional jobs program with more comprehensive services and 
find short term employment significantly higher under the treatment, but longer run employment 
does not appear to be effected. Bond et al. (2015) examine an intensive placement services 
program and finds significant effects on employment, but insignificant effects on recidivism. In 
contrast, Redcross, Barden and Bloom (2016) find that while employment effects of a 
transitional jobs demonstration were short run, recidivism was reduced. 
Several key points should be kept in mind about existing experimental literature. First, 
almost all the studies are quite dated; the most recent study in Visher et al.’s meta-analysis was 
from 1999. They note that the lack of federal funding for ex-offender programs in the 1980s 
created a gap in the development and implementation of such programs. Second, the types of 
offenses and number of arrests may matter for the efficacy of employment services. The OPTS 
program, initiated in 1994, targeted ex-offenders with histories of alcohol and drug offenses. The 
LIFE program targeted those with high likelihoods of future arrest for property crimes and no 
history of drug or alcohol dependence. The NSW evaluation distinguished drug addicts from ex-
offenders. 
Reintegrating ex-offenders back into mainstream employment has provided motivation 
for recent “ban the box” policies. Nationwide, 35 states and over 150 cities and counties have 
adopted such policies which remove conviction history from job applications and delay 
background checks until later in the hiring process (Avery, 2019). However, such requirements 
are less frequent for private employment, where only 13 states and 18 cities have such policies. 
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Such laws have become increasing popular in the last 10 years; prior to 2010, only two states had 
such policies. There is a growing literature that has examined these policies using the quasi-
experimental variation created across geography and over time. Recent work examines callback 
rates in field experiments (Agan and Starr, 2018), and employment with observational data 
(Doleac and Hansen, 2020). Other work has directly examined employment outcomes for those 
with criminal histories with administrative data (Jackson and Zhao, 2017; Rose 2018). 
Unfortunately, ban the box policies appear to be ineffective at improving employment outcomes, 
and other policies that directly address employers’ concerns about ex-offenders are likely to be 
more effective (Doleac, 2019). 
This paper contributes to existing knowledge in several ways. The America Works RCT 
is relatively recent compared with other published experimental estimates; the experimental 
intervention occurred in 2009 and 2010, with recidivism measured through 2012. The 
experiment examines the impact a costly short-term intervention – improving job readiness for 
ex-offenders. We find heterogeneous effects based on offenders’ arrest histories (violent from 
non-violent). 
 
III. Understanding the America Works Intervention 
 
1. Description of the Randomized Control Trial 
 
The RCT was overseen by Public/Private Ventures (P/PV), a nonprofit, nonpartisan, 
social research and policy organization whose mission was to improve the effectiveness of 
policies, programs, and community initiatives, especially as they affect vulnerable communities, 
at the America Works offices in 2009 and 2010.9 
Recruitment of this study’s 259 participants (which includes 254 ex-offenders and 5 
hardship cases) took place at the New York offices of America Works from June 15, 2009, to 
December 17, 2010. Participants were all men who had been released from a prison, jail, or 
youth correctional facility within six months prior to their acceptance in the program. When a 
potential participant was identified, America Works described its program and completed typical 
intake procedures. America Works explained that a study of the program was being conducted 
and that participants had a 50/50 chance of receiving “intensive” job assistance, while other 
 
9 The discussion in this section follows directly from P/PV’s document “AW Study Rationale Brief,” August 2006. 
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participants would receive “typical” job assistance. America Works then distributed written 
informed consent forms to potential participants. 
This RCT therefore aims to increase knowledge about the effectiveness of rapid 
attachment to the labor market; given data constraints discussed later, the analysis here examines 
the causal effect of intensive job assistance services on criminal recidivism. Although the 
underlying causal mechanism is that such intensive assistance leads to better labor-market 
outcomes and less dependence on government programs – both of which, in turn, lead to 
reductions in recidivism – it is more difficult to convincingly examine intermediate steps due to 
data availability. 
Both the intensive job assistance program and the standard program were administered by 
America Works. The intensive program included job-readiness training, job placement, and job 
retention. The program typically lasted two weeks with nearly daily training. The training 
typically focused on developing self-presentation skills through interview rehearsals and résumé 
preparation. The training also included work on following directions and communications with 
supervisors and co-workers. Following training, America Works arranges job interviews with 
employers and, when the placement is made, stays in contact with new hires and their employers 
for six months. The intensive job assistance program is unique, but well established. The 
combination of both intensive training and the intensive placement and follow up services is 
likely extremely important, and we describe some of the details of the program below. While this 
study is unique in examining the role of this program, we are limited in that we cannot 
differentiate the importance of the individual aspects of the program. 
The key difference between the treatment and control group is the scope and focus of 
services offered. P/PV documentation described enhanced services as: (1) intensive job-readiness 
training, (2) rapid-attachment job-placement services, and (3) retention services. Typical services 
involved: (1) job-readiness training and (2) self-directed job-search assistance.10 
 
 
10 On its website, America Works describes four steps that it takes to get program participants back to full-time work 
rapidly. One step is a job-readiness program focusing on the “hard” and “soft” skills that employers are looking for. 
A second is sending participants to interviews and matching them with specific jobs. A third is continuing support 
for the participant after he finds a job (i.e., have a case manager follow up to ensure that the client is getting to work 
on time each day). A final step is working with participants to ensure that they are taking advantage of opportunities 
to increase their human capital (work-training programs, GED classes, etc.). See 





2. Findings from Site Visits 
 
During the initial evaluation, P/PV conducted a set of site visits to better understand the 
“black box” of intensive job search assistance at America Works. We have reviewed 105 pages 
of protocols and notes from 29 separate documents from site visits conducted between 
November 7-9, 2005 to three separate America Works offices in the Bronx, Queens, and 
Manhattan. 
Standard job search assistance allows the client use of the resources at America Works 
(AW), but is self-directed. Resources include job listings and access to computers and 
telephones. The director of one AW office noted: “They can go online and look for jobs and 
newspapers and we get the employment weekly and using monster.com. We have a resource 
room. Participants use them. The internet is the most popular.” Given the limited resources of 
AW clients, this increased accessibility potentially leads to jobs. However, one placement 
specialist noted that at the AW office “there’s only two phones and four computers. Not 50-60 
people are going to use those computers. Some clients have to wait to use the computer.” 
Moreover, client motivation is critical to placement success. The same placement specialist noted 
“Depending on the client, there are a couple that don’t want to do anything but a lot of others use 
the newspapers and use the computer to come in and look for work.” 
Intensive job search assistance provides a comprehensive package of services. There are 
many differences from standard job search assistance, but one key difference is the follow-up 
and communication with the employer partners in the intensive program, and value the long-run 
relationship with employer partners. AW is well-incentivized to successfully place clients 
because it is a for-profit company with performance-based contracts. As a consequence, the 
“intensive” product consists of standard inputs into job search and also the culture at AW, which 
may be thought of as the intensity. 
The director of one AW office describes the intensive package of services as: 
orientation/basic skills testing, then training, then job placement. Many hard-to-quantify features 
enter into the intensive program. For example, AW’s “hands on” services focus on the barriers 
their clients encounter in obtaining jobs. These include language obstacles (most of AW’s 
employees are bilingual) and case management (difficulties with child care, transportation, and 
parole officers). AW’s intensive program lowers the barriers for their clients to be successful at 
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jobs. For example the director mentioned “I tell the parole officers, ‘Use us instead of using you’ 
(to be the hammer making things happen with a client) and I tell them (officers) we’ll call you 
with updates) and the employers will call you.” The “hands on” approach is also reflected in AW 
employees having an open-door policy with clients, and providing cell phone numbers that 
clients can reach them after-hours. 
In the intensive program, barriers are lowered, for example, by the office director 
personally reviewing the client’s resume. “I do all the resumes here because I really believe all 
the candidates need a really good one. I want them to have one, that if it came across my desk, 
how would I want it to look. It’s our name (America Works) - and I want it to look good. We 
demand them to dress perfectly for an interview.” 
The key theme, however, that was highlighted in virtually all site interviews was the 
long-run relationship between AW and employers. The AW performance-based contracts with 
intensive training provide stronger incentive for successful placements. Essentially, AW screens 
clients based on skills, personality, motivation and background for each job placement, and 
matches with employers where the likelihood of a long-run match is high. The employer partners 
that AW interacts with desire reliable employees who will not create undue risk and are willing 
to work long-term. As a consequence, some AW clients – such as those with extensive criminal 
backgrounds or violent histories – may not be suitable matches for many employers. One 
employer partner describes AW’s reputation relative to other placement services: “It’s nice to 
have somebody who’s going to check everything for you. Like when we hire from outside 
sources, we have problems. We like to hire people with recommendations.” The employer goes 
on to mention “You know, we walk into homes that are million-dollar homes … that’s a liability 
for us. So it’s nice to have somebody who checks their background from us” and “It’s important 
to us they understand they know what they are getting into. We don’t like people leaving after a 
week or two.” 
In addition, AW provides follow-up after job placement, which the director calls “roster 
management”, another key difference between intensive and standard assistance. “We set up a 
roster-management system, because we have to stop all bad things from happening for those 
individuals — there are important things HRA has to know about because HRA has multiple job 
centers that are really welfare officers and those case managers there don’t have a clue what’s 
been going on with the client. So it creates centralized case management database with HRA.” 
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The control group that gets standard job search assistance does not get such follow-up with roster 
management: “I don’t like to see candidates stagnate which is an issue with this study because 
the control group will be allowed to stagnate.” As an example of roster management, the director 
mentioned “(the sales director is) talking to an employer and saying (an AW client) will begin as 
a home health aid on Tuesday and I’m going to give you the name of follow-up person and then 
we find out if there are any transportation problems, and we can call the client and find out how 
it’s going. Every candidate has our cell phone number.” 
 
IV. Research Questions: Opportunities and Limitations 
 
Although P/PV successfully carried out the randomized intervention of enhanced job 
placement at the offices of America Works, collecting baseline demographic and socioeconomic 
data at the time of the trial as well, P/PV was unable to gather data on certain outcomes that 
might have resulted from the intervention–outcomes pertaining to the labor market, use of 
government welfare programs, and criminal activity. Such data are necessary to determine if 
enhanced services have beneficial effects in those areas. Although gathering data on welfare use 
and labor-market outcomes was deemed infeasible, we were able to obtain comprehensive data 
on criminal histories, both before and after the experimental intervention. Criminal history record 
searches were conducted through the New York State Unified Court System in early August 
2012. The court system website describes the record search: 
“The New York State Office of Court Administration (OCA) provides a New York 
Statewide criminal history record search (CHRS) for a fee of $65.00.11 One can submit a 
CHRS request via the on-line Direct Access program or by mailing in a CHRS 
application form. The search criteria are based on an exact match of Name and date of 
birth. The search results are public records relating to open/pending and convictions in 
criminal cases originating from courts of all 62 counties.” 
We obtained criminal histories for felony and misdemeanor cases that occurred in New York for 
the study’s 259 participants; the analysis uses 219 participants with successful links between the 
data sources. Although criminal history records are available from all counties, initial data 
 




collection started at different points in time (from 1978 to 1993). 
 
V. Data Description and Recidivism Results 
 
1. Data Description 
 
Data provided on the ex-offenders derive from two main sources. The primary source, 
which identifies ex-offenders in the experiment, is the baseline survey administered at the initial 
intake interview, as well as information on whether individuals were assigned to the intensive 
job assistance program (treatment group) or the standard program (control group). While data 
collected by P/PV concerning the treatment and control groups are complete, the baseline survey 
data were often incomplete, with many missing observations on specific questions. The primary 
data were then matched to public records on arrests and convictions (primarily from New York 
State) to form a criminal history of each participant. That history starts prior to the experiment 
and ends in July 2012. 
As noted, 259 ex-offenders were enlisted for the study (including five “hardship cases”). 
They joined the study on a rolling basis from June 15, 2009, to December 17, 2010, with 130 in 
the treatment group and 129 in the control group. From this initial group of 259 ex-offenders, we 
were able to obtain accurate redacted arrest records for 219 of them, using public records from 
New York’s OCA. Overall, 1,027 pages of arrest records were collected for the 219 individuals. 
Because arrest records for the remaining 40 ex-offenders could not be found, those individuals 
were excluded from the analysis. The original randomization resulted in 50.2% of the 
participants assigned to the treatment group (130/259). After merging with arrest records, 50.2% 
(110/219) of the remaining observations are in the treatment group.  
Appendix Table 1 examines whether the 40 individuals for whom arrest records were 
unavailable have any significant differences in either treatment group or control variables. We 
regress an indicator for inclusion in the cases above on three sets of control variables. In all three 
models the regressions were insignificant (F-tests well below conventional rejection levels, 
reported in last row). While not reported here, additional robustness tests for all main results 
were performed by using Heckman sample selection models. Since the first stage – reported in 
Appendix Table 1 – has no explanatory power, it is unsurprising that the results were robust to 
controlling for selection. We found no evidence of selection into finding arrest records.  
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Using these detailed arrest records, the 219 remaining participants in the study were 
organized into two categories based on criminal acts prior to enrollment in the America Works 
experiment: Violent ex-offenders and non-violent ex-offenders. When classifying study 
participants in these two groups, we assumed a hierarchical structure under which an individual 
was included in only one group. If the individual had been arrested for a violent crime and a 
property crime, he would be classified in the violent bin. Violent ex-offenders were defined as 
those who had committed any violent crime, as defined by the FBI Uniform Crime Reports, prior 
to participating in the America Works experiment. Under that definition, violent crime includes 
murder, rape/sexual assault, assault, and robbery. Non-violent ex-offenders include those who 
committed crimes against another person’s property (burglary, grand larceny, trespassing, etc.), 
drug ex-offenders who had been convicted of selling or possessing controlled substances, and 
petty crimes including traffic/motor vehicle violations, criminal contempt, and harassment. 
 
2. Summary Statistics 
 
We create several variables that align arrests (or charges) with the timing of the 
experimental intervention that was rolled out from June 2009 to December 2010. We create 
variables for whether the participant was subsequently arrested, as well as the number of arrests, 
and for instances when demographics were missing from the baseline survey, we replaced the 
variable with imputation methods described below (in the regressions). 
An important, necessary step for causal inference is confidence that the experimental 
intervention was assigned randomly. We explore this in Table 1, where we examine the 
relationship between being assigned to the treatment group and the control variables. With minor 
exceptions, the individual covariates appear unrelated to assignment of experimental treatment to 
intensive job assistance. We estimate the model for the full sample, as well as each of the 
subgroups: violent and non-violent offenders. In all three models, the F-tests of significance of 
the characteristics to predict the treatment (see last row) were well below conventional rejection 
levels. We cannot reject the null that the characteristics as a whole do not predict treatment 
status. Additionally, we performed a joint multi-variate test comparing the treatment and control 
group characteristics, the F(21,195) test statistic was 0.71 which has a p-value of 0.82. We accept 
the null that the means of these characteristics are not different across the two treatment 
categories. There is no evidence against random assignment of treatment. 
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We show summary statistics on arrests and baseline demographics in Table 2, for the full 
sample, as well as violent and non-violent ex-offenders. Recidivism – defined as being arrested 
after the experimental intervention – was observed for at least 18 months and as many as 36 
months after the intervention. The earliest participants (enrolled in June 2009) were observed for 
the full 36 months while the latest participants (enrolled in December 2010) were only observed 
for 18 months. Criminal histories were obtained in early August 2012; in the analysis below, the 
cutoff for being observed is July 31, 2012. We have also tested, and the average length of 
observation is not different between the treatment and control group. 
A baseline survey was administered to all participants regardless of assignment of 
standard or intensive job assistance. It asked straightforward demographic and socioeconomic 
questions, as well as asking respondents to self-report their criminal histories, participation in 
prison programs, and substance abuse/mental health. 
The average age of ex-offenders was 39, with little variation across treatment and control 
groups. Only 7.4 percent of participants were married: those in the control group were slightly 
more likely to be married (8.3 percent) than those in the treatment group (6.4 percent). Many 
respondents did not provide an answer for education level; only 129 (58 percent) of ex-offenders 
responded. Of those who did, over 72 percent reported having a high school or high school–
equivalent degree, with the treatment group having a slightly higher rate, nearly 74 percent.  
Non-response to race/ethnicity was also high, with 136 ex-offenders providing an answer. 
The vast majority (over 73 percent) reported African-American/black and over 23 percent 
reported Hispanic. Nearly 73 percent of ex-offenders possessed some kind of vocational training, 
and more than 60 percent had participated in job-training programs (of which nearly 42 percent 
participated while in prison). Fully 62 percent of the ex-offenders participated in a prerelease 
program. Nearly 73 percent reported receiving drug or alcohol treatment. The demographics 
from baseline survey makes clear that this group would struggle to obtain work. 
Criminal histories were obtained from public records in New York State and merged with 
data collected by P/PV. Since criminal histories were limited to arrests and charges in New York, 
they represent an understatement if arrests and charges occurred in other states or were 
associated with aliases not linked to the individual. For both the treatment and control group, 
participants had approximately 6 arrests prior to the intervention. 
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Overall, as can be seen in the last row of Table 2, fully 70% of our observations had at 
least one missing value for these covariates. In order to address this, we used the multiple 
imputation procedure in Stata. This procedure first estimates models for each of the missing 
variables. Logit models were used in this step. The multiple imputation procedure then generates 
imputations which include randomness comparable to that of the observed data (for example, for 
a dummy variable, the first stage model provides the predicted probability for each observation, 
Stata then draws from a Bernoulli using those probabilities). The model is then estimated using 
these imputations. The procedure is repeated, to arrive at multiple estimates and Rubin’s Rule is 
used to combine the estimates and estimate the standard errors. The Rubin’s Rule standard errors 
reflect not only the usual sampling variation, but variation due to the imputation approach as 
well. All estimates reported here using covariates employ this approach (including appendix 
tables). While not reported here, three other approaches were considered: complete case, 
replacing the missing data with the sample mean, and replacing the missing data with the sample 
mean and including a dummy indicating missing data. All results are robust across these 
approaches. 
 
3. Recidivism and Number of Arrests 
 
In our first set of regressions in Table 3, we examine the likelihood of subsequently getting 
arrested after the job assistance intervention. In all columns, we estimate linear probability 
models with heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. For the full sample, in column 1, the 
overall re-arrest rate is 47.5%. Intensive job assistance insignificantly lowers the arrest rate 7.7 
percentage points. In columns 2 and 3, we separate the sample of ex-offenders into the violent 
(126) and non-violent (93) groups based on their arrest record prior to treatment. The impact of 
intensive job assistance on arrest rates of violent ex-offenders is insignificant and substantively 
small; the coefficient estimate would imply a reduction in the likelihood of arrest of 1.6 
percentage points from a mean of 51.4%. For non-violent ex-offenders, intensive job assistance 
causes a 16.5 percentage point reduction in the likelihood of getting arrested, from a mean of 
43.6%. The latter two columns show an economically important difference in the impact of the 
intervention based on the nature of the offense.  
In essence, our findings show that moderately-costly intensive job assistance is effective for 
ex-offenders who might be easier to re-integrate into the labor force in the first place (non-
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violent ex-offenders), which in turn would lead to higher (unobserved) labor force participation 
and lower observed recidivism (Schnepel, 2018; Yang, 2017). In contrast, it may be the case that 
such training leads to less successful re-integration into the labor force for violent ex-offenders 
who pose substantially more downside risk to the firm, or it may be that possible the relationship 
between labor force participation and recidivism is fundamentally weaker for those with violent 
histories. 
In columns (4)-(5), we add individual covariates to the recidivism model for violent and non-
violent ex-offenders. We include number of pre-intervention arrests, age, marital status, 
education, drug/alcohol treatment, race/ethnicity, and various training programs that could be 
done in prison. Most of these individual characteristics insignificantly affect the likelihood of 
recidivism for violent ex-offenders, and their inclusion does not affect the findings about the 
ineffectiveness of intensive job assistance. However, the overall explanatory power of the model 
increases (via R-squared). The coefficient estimate for non-violent ex-offenders becomes 
statistically significant, but the magnitude does not change substantively and is consistent with 
the premise that treatment was random. The one noteworthy result is that the number of arrests 
prior to the intervention is strongly related to subsequent recidivism; each additional arrest raises 
likelihood of recidivism by 3.6 percentage points (and violent ex-offenders have, on average, 6.1 
prior arrests). For non-violent ex-offenders, the impact of intensive job assistance is slightly 
larger, reducing the likelihood of recidivism by 19.2 percentage points (p=0.07). Few of the 
individual characteristics appear to affect recidivism, although each additional arrest prior to the 
intervention raises the likelihood of recidivism by 3.4 percentage points (and they have, on 
average, 5.9 prior arrests). 
Finally, in columns (6)-(7), we use regression-adjusted inverse probability weighted average 
treatment effect estimators. This approach offers the advantage of both a more flexible functional 
form (through the regression adjustment), and reweighting by any differences in treatment 
assignment characteristics (through the inverse probability weights). We include the same 
covariates as in columns (4) and (5). For violent ex-offenders in column (6), the treatment effects 
model again shows a small and insignificant reduction in recidivism (of 3.2 percentage points, 
p=0.75). For non-violent ex-offenders in column (7), we observe a reduction in recidivism of 
18.1 percentage points (p=0.066), very similar to the regression results in column (5). 
18 
 
We next examine the number of post-intervention arrests in Table 4. We note that coefficient 
estimates here may be less comparable for violent and non-violent offenders, if violent offenders 
are likely to be re-arrested for more serious offenses, and as a consequence, to be incarcerated for 
longer periods of time in the post-intervention period, thus having fewer chances to be re-
arrested. We estimate Tobit models since nearly half the sample are not re-arrested (and thus 
have a zero) during our window (see Table 2). This constitutes a censored model. Our results are 
shown for the full sample in column (1), as well as separated for violent (column 2 and 4) and 
non-violent (column 3 and 5) ex-offenders (both with and without individual covariates). In the 
simple models with no covariates, the coefficient on treatment is -0.63 for violent offenders and -
0.83 for non-violent offenders. When control variables are included, the coefficient on violent 
offenders is -0.16 while the coefficient on non-violent offenders is -1.04 with a p-value of 0.040. 
Like arrests, we find evidence that the treatment reduces recidivism for the non-violent 
offenders, but no evidence of that claim for the violent offenders. 
We have performed a number of robustness checks.12 First, we estimate the full regression 
model for any arrest without including observations where the control variables were imputed. 
The exercise reduces sample size, and as expected, statistical significance. However, the estimate 
of the treatment coefficient for non-violent ex-offenders remains negative (and larger at -0.52), 
while the estimate for the treatment effect for violent ex-offenders is positive at 0.05. We also 
estimate a logit model for the arrests and obtain a marginal effect of -0.14 for the non-violent ex-
offenders with a p-value of 0.055, while the estimated marginal effect for the violent offenders is 
insignificant and small at 0.004. A number of different options for estimation of treatment 
effects, such as inverse probability weighting, matching and regression adjustment, were 
considered. Under the assumption of random assignment, all should be equivalent estimators to 
the simple differences in means. Regression adjusting (as in the OLS estimates), increased 
statistical significance, but little impact on magnitudes. Other approaches had similar impact on 
effects, but varied in precision, as would be expected. In summary, our results appear to be quite 






12 All output from the robustness checks is available from the authors. 
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VI. Costs and Benefits of Enhanced Job Placement 
 
The principal finding is best captured in the recidivism measures. However, given that it 
costs approximately $5,000 to place someone in a job through an intensive America Works job 
assistance program, it is important to obtain some estimate of the social benefit of the reduction 
in arrests.13 Establishing social costs of crime is challenging. We use existing studies, along with 
the nature of the arrest and charges, to assign a dollar value for each crime committed by an ex-
offender, both pre- and post-treatment. Appendix Table 2 summarizes the estimated social costs 
for various crime categories from eight different studies. The social costs for violent crimes – 
especially murder – are extremely high, while many nonviolent crimes impose relatively modest 
social costs. In the following analysis, we rely on estimates in comprehensive studies by Cohen 
and Piquero (2009) and McCollister et al. (2010). 
Our analysis proceeds in several steps. First, we know all charges (both pre- and post- 
intervention) from the arrest records for the 219 successfully merged individuals. We classify the 
charges related with arrests (type and quantity) in terms of FBI classifications for crimes, 
including several miscellaneous categories. Second, each charge associated with an arrest was 
assigned a social cost value derived from Cohen and Piquero (2009), which is column 4 in 
Appendix Table 2. This study was chosen because it had the most comprehensive list of social 
costs for crimes out of the eight studies. When a cost estimate was unavailable, we used 
estimates from McCollister et al. (2010). This allowed us to additionally provide social costs for 
household crimes, embezzlement, stolen property, and forgery and counterfeiting. Many of the 
estimates by crime category are fairly similar, with the notable exception of murder (where we 
use a social cost of crime of $4.6 million for the 30 recorded murders/other charges related to 
loss of life from Cohen and Piquero (2009) rather than $9.0 million from McColister et al. 
(2010)). Finally, based on the social costs associated with the charges, we compute the total 
social cost of crime (both pre- and post-treatment). 
We observed in Table 3 that recidivism fell for non-violent offenders, and that total 
arrests were responsive to the intervention in Table 4. However, the analysis is silent on whether 
the nature of crimes committed changed due to the intensive job training. One important 
assumption in the crime analysis – for recidivism, arrests, or especially for the social cost of 
 
13 For the cost estimate on the intensive job placement program from America Works, see Cove (2013). 
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crime – is that arrests reflect the underlying crime on the ground. To the extent that arrest rates 
differed by individual covariates (for example, by race, where we expect that African-American 
men might be arrested at greater rates for the same offense than white men), it may well be the 
case that we misstate the social cost of crime. However, Table 4 suggests no difference in arrests 
within this sample by race/ethnicity, nor is the experimental intervention of intensive job training 
differentially administered by race. 
For the full sample, the social cost of crimes committed post-treatment was 
approximately $103,000. For the roughly half of ex-offenders who were re-arrested, the average 
social cost exceed $219,000. The median social cost, conditional on arrest, is $7,500, while the 
75th percentile exceeds $230,000. Assuming that arrests reflect overall crime activity, a 
significant percentage of ex-offenders who get arrested impose large societal costs. Given the 
large number of zeros in our data (due to not being arrested), Table 5 estimates Tobit models 
(assuming zero social cost for participants without arrests). The outcome of interest is the social 
cost of the crimes (arrests) committed, post-treatment. For the full sample (without covariates), 
column (1) reveals that the intensive job assistance treatment reduced social costs by more than 
$151,000 (p=0.12, with 116 left-censored observations out of 219). The reduced cost is much 
lower for violent ex-offenders, and imprecisely estimated in column (2), while the reduced cost 
is much larger in magnitude – nearly $324,000 in social costs avoided (p=0.12) – for non-violent 
ex-offenders who received the treatment in column (3). Adding individual characteristics does 
change the magnitudes, but not the substantive conclusions in columns (4) and (5). For violent 
ex-offenders, the results are imprecise. For non-violent ex-offenders, social costs are 
significantly reduced by more than $436,000 (p=0.067) from the intervention. As in earlier 
tables, many of the covariates are weakly related to social costs. Consistent with earlier tables, 
the number of arrests prior to treatment – for both violent and non-violent ex-offenders – 
significantly increases subsequent social costs after the treatment. 
These results help establish the cost-benefit analysis of the America Works program. 
Treatment cost for one ex-offender in the intensive program is approximately $5,000 (Cove, 
2013), meaning this is also the upper bound on the marginal cost of the intensive intervention. 
While caution should be taken in using these estimates, the overall result is striking: providing 
intensive job-training and job-search services to non-violent ex-offenders more than pays for 
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itself by reducing the social costs of crime. However, there is little evidence that such treatment 




This paper examines the impact of intensive job-readiness training and job-search 
assistance on criminal recidivism and labor-market outcomes among ex-offenders, using data 
from a randomized controlled trial conducted at the America Works job-placement agency. 
Overall, such training and assistance had no effect on recidivism. This result nonetheless masks 
substantial heterogeneity of outcomes. 
For the roughly half of program participants with nonviolent arrest histories, intensive 
job-search assistance significantly decreased the likelihood of recidivism. Only 31 percent of 
nonviolent offenders receiving intensive job training were subsequently rearrested; among 
participants receiving standard training, on the other hand, 50 percent were subsequently 
rearrested. Such results suggest that enhanced job-search assistance is most effective for the 
easiest of the hard-to-serve population (i.e., those without histories of violence and few charges) 
and far less effective for clients with more difficult histories of arrests and charges. 
Although these results on criminal recidivism are noteworthy, we were unable to answer 
a number of other important questions originally posed when P/PV set up the experiment, 
including: (1) Did participation in America Works intensive job assistance program increase ex-
offenders’ likelihood of finding and maintaining employment over those who did not receive 
intensive services? (2) Did the intensive program help ex-offenders find jobs of a higher quality 
than they would otherwise have found on their own? (3) Did participation in the intensive 
program reduce reliance on cash assistance from the government? (4) Did participation increase 
formal participation in the child-support system? Data constraints preclude us from answering 
these questions. To address them, we would require high-quality administrative data or the 
opportunity to re-interview ex-offenders many years after initial contact with America Works. 
Such approaches, while conceptually possible, are difficult, given budgetary and privacy 
constraints. 
Two of additional limitations should be acknowledged. First, the program took place 
during the Great Recession. It is possible that this reduced the effectiveness of the program. 
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Second, the size of the experiment was modest and clearly impacted the conclusions we could 
draw. Further there was some attrition from the data collection process which may be important.  
Nonetheless, this paper’s findings on recidivism suggest that the obvious path to 
improvement in the lives of ex-offenders – as well as the welfare of society at large – runs 
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Treatment balance – Do observable, fixed characteristics influence likelihood of intensive intervention? 
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F-test 0.69 1.11 0.82 
p-value of F 0.85 0.35 0.70 
N 219 126 93 
Notes: Authors’ analysis of participants in the America Works experiment using linear probability model, where the outcome 
of interest is assignment to the intensive job assistance program (in contrast to standard assistance). With the exception of 
arrests, all individual characteristics are from the baseline intake interview. Pre-treatment arrests are derived from 
administrative arrest records obtained in August 2012, along with date of randomized job assistance intervention (between 






















Treatment Status (Intensive Job Assistance) 219 0.502 109 0.000 110 1.000 
Arrested, Post-Intervention 219 0.475 109 0.514 110 0.436 
Total Arrests, Post-Intervention 219 1.068 109 1.266 110 0.873 
Total Arrests, Pre-Intervention 219 6.05 109 6.165 110 5.936 
Violent Offender 219 0.575 109 0.56 110 0.591 
Non-Violent Offender 219 0.425 109 0.44 110 0.409 
Total Days Observed 219 879.1 109 875.3 110 883 
Age 218 39.17 109 38.88 109 39.45 
Married 134 0.119 66 0.136 68 0.103 
Black 136 0.735 67 0.731 69 0.739 
Hispanic 136 0.235 67 0.239 69 0.232 
White 136 0.0221 67 0.015 69 0.029 
Asian 136 0.0074 67 0.015 69 0.000 
American Indian 136 0.0221 67 0.015 69 0.029 
Pacific Islander 136 0.0074 67 0.000 69 0.015 
Disability 198 0.091 97 0.093 101 0.089 
High School/GED Ed 129 0.721 64 0.703 65 0.738 
Drug/Alcohol Treatment 125 0.728 60 0.717 65 0.738 
Vocational Training 215 0.73 107 0.720 108 0.741 
Educational Training 212 0.608 106 0.566 106 0.651 
Job Training 216 0.616 106 0.557 110 0.673 
Life Skills 211 0.441 104 0.394 107 0.486 
Religious Studies 206 0.442 101 0.436 105 0.448 
Prisoner Assistance 214 0.327 106 0.283 108 0.37 
Other Self Help 217 0.327 107 0.262 110 0.391 
Ethnic Organization 213 0.183 104 0.135 109 0.229 
Pre-Release Program 216 0.616 106 0.557 110 0.673 
Community Acts 213 0.258 105 0.171 108 0.343 
Arts & Crafts 210 0.167 105 0.143 105 0.19 
Paid Work 213 0.408 105 0.429 108 0.389 
Prior Job Training 211 0.417 105 0.362 106 0.472 
Any Missing 219 0.712 109 0.716 110 0.709 
Notes: Authors’ tabulations of baseline data and administrative arrest data. In the subsequent regressions, 






Arrested Post-Intervention? (1=yes, 0=no) 
 Linear probability model Treatment Effects 
Estimator 
 All Violent Non-Violent Violent Non-Violent Violent Non-
Violent 







































































































































𝑅2 0.006 0.0003 0.0277 0.246 0.357 --- --- 
Notes: Authors’ analysis of 219 participants in the America Works experiment, with 126 violent and 93 non-violent ex-
offenders. Linear probability model is used in columns (1)-(5) with heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors, and a 
regression adjusted-inverse probability weighted treatment effects model in columns (6)-(7), where the outcome of interest is 
whether the ex-offender was arrested any time after the experimental intervention. With the exception of pre-intervention 
arrests, all individual characteristics are from the baseline intake interview. Pre-treatment arrests are derived from 
administrative arrest records obtained in August 2012, along with date of randomized job assistance intervention (between 





Tobit, Number of Arrests, Post-Intervention 
 All Violent Non-Violent Violent Non-Violent 








































































































Notes: Authors’ analysis of 219 participants in the America Works experiment, with 126 violent and 93 non-violent ex-
offenders. Tobit model is used in columns (1)-(5), where the outcome of interest is number of post-intervention arrests. With 
the exception of pre-intervention arrests, all individual characteristics are from the baseline intake interview. Pre-treatment 
arrests are derived from administrative arrest records obtained in August 2012, along with date of randomized job assistance 





Tobit, Social Cost of Arrests, Post-Intervention 
 All Violent Non-Violent Violent Non-Violent 








































































































Notes: Authors’ analysis of 219 participants in the America Works experiment, with 126 violent and 93 non-violent ex-
offenders. Tobit model is used in columns (1)-(5), where the outcome of interest is social cost of post-intervention arrests. 
With the exception of pre-intervention arrests, all individual characteristics are from the baseline intake interview. Pre-
treatment arrests are derived from administrative arrest records obtained in August 2012, along with date of randomized job 





Appendix Table 1: Analysis of Non-followed 
  (1) (2) (3) 


































Vocational Training   0.056 
(0.068) 
Educational Training   0.010 
(0.055) 
Job Training   0.085 
(0.066) 
Life Skills   -0.078 
(0.065) 
Religious Studies   -0.045 
(0.050) 
Prisoner Assistance   0.102 
(0.064) 
Other Self Help   -0.014 
(0.065) 
Ethnic Organization   -0.088 
(0.076) 
Pre-Release Program   -0.078 
(0.064) 
Community Acts   0.052 
(0.062) 
Arts & Crafts   -0.047 
(0.074) 
Paid Work   0.019 
(0.048) 








F-test 0.03 0.93 0.98 
p-value of F-test 0.86 0.49 0.49 
N 256 256 256 
Notes: Authors’ analysis of 256 initial participants in the America Works experiment using linear probability model, where 
the outcome of interest is whether arrest records could be matched to the provided individual identifiers. Fully 219 
participants could be matched with arrest records and were included in the subsequent analysis. Individual characteristics are 







Appendix Table 2 
Summary of Unit Crime Cost Estimates Reported in Literature (2008 dollars) 
Type of Crime 
(1) 


































Rape/Sexual assault 369,739 97,962 286,277 290,000 80,403 124,419 
 
240,776 
Aggravated assault 105,545 23,025 84,555 85,000 24,987.00 21,451 76,829 107,020 
Armed robbery 
   
280,000 
    
Robbery 219,286 24,168 280,237 39,000 33,036 18,591 33,143 42,310 
Arson 
   









529 1,104 3,532 











2,145 1,974 6,462 
Drunk-driving 
crash 
   
60,000 




    
Embezzlement 
       
5,480 
Fraud 
   
5,500 
   
5,032 
Stolen property 22,739 




      
833 5,265 
Vandalism 
   
2,000 




   
500 
    
Note: Unit cost values inflated using Bureau of Labor Statistics inflation calculator based on consumer price index (CPI). U.S. Department of 
Labor 2008; see http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm. 
 
(1) Estimates combine Washington State and local governmental operating costs paid by taxpayers (originally reported in 2000 dollars) and 
costs incurred by crime victims from Miller et al. 1996 (reported in 1995 dollars). Values reflect present value cost of each offense used to 
calculate the benefits of adult community-based substance-abuse treatment. Cost per assault is for aggravated assault. 
(2) Original estimates in 1985 dollars. Jury compensation approach to estimate monetary value for pain, suffering, and fear in personal injury 
cases. 
(3) Original crime cost estimates in 2000 dollars. Estimated using contingent valuation method (willingness to pay). 
(4) Additional estimates to (2) by including (3). 
(5) Original estimates in 1989 dollars. Victim costs of violent crime and resulting injuries. 
(6) Original estimates in 1993 dollars. Estimates reflect victim losses including medical and mental health–care spending, tangible losses, and 
reduced quality of life. Excludes adjudication and sanctioning. 
(7) Original crime cost estimates reported in 1992 dollars. Estimated using combination of cost of illness and jury compensation approaches. 
Cost of assault is for aggravated assault. 
(8) Unit cost estimates. Cost of assault is for aggravated assault. 
 
